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Introduction 
The Patent and Copyright Clause—the choice of name is itself 
instructive—is the source of many interpretive and practical difficulties. 
Like all clauses of the Constitution, it is short, and it is precisely in its 
brevity that much of its difficulty arises. Thus, the familiar clause reads: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]1 
 
†  The Laurence A Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School 
of Law, The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover 
Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of 
Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. This paper 
was initially prepared for a Conference on the Historical Origins of the 
Patent Clause, which was scheduled to be held on March 13–14 (2020) 
organized by the Classical Liberal Institute and held at NYU Law School. 
That conference never took place but the paper was presented online to 
the conference participants and benefited greatly from their comments. I 
have also benefitted from comments received at the NYU Work in 
Progress workshop held on November 2, 2020. My thanks to Kenneth Lee, 
Christian McGuire, Micah Quigley, and Riley Walters, of the University 
of Chicago Law School. I offer a special word of thanks to Tomás Gómez-
Arostegui, whose knowledge of the relevant sources is seemingly 
inexhaustible, for his wise guidance on reviewing much of the historical 
material. 
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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As the title to this article indicates, I shall engage in some sort of 
a quasi-originalist inquiry into the proper interpretation of this clause, 
in an effort to find out how it was understood during the founding 
period. I shall largely restrict myself to the patent line of cases. The 
evidence will in some cases go beyond that period to cover nineteenth-
century cases which offer an accurate reflection of the earlier thinking, 
insofar as they exhibit no intention to alter the law from the way in 
which it was originally formed. The issue is of no little importance 
because the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have 
tended to take a restrictive view of the rights of patentees, and the 
protection of patents under the law. Both Mayo Collaborative Services 
v. Prometheus Laboratories2 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inter–
national3 gave narrow accounts of the class of potential inventions that 
should be regarded as patent-eligible under Section 101 of the Patent 
Act,4 in the case of medical tests on the one hand, and financial analysis 
on the other.5 The case of Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s 
 
2. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). The issue discussed is orthogonal to the question of 
whether patents offer property rights. Instead, it holds that a method for 
calculating proper dosage of thiopurine to treat autoimmune diseases 
should be treated as an unpatentable law of nature. Id. at 72–73. The case 
represents a weird expansion of laws of nature to cover tests in particular 
context that require huge ingenuity to discover, and which cannot be 
simply derived as a matter of first principle from a set of formal axioms.  
3. 573 U.S. 208 (2014). For an application of its rule, see American Axle & 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. NEAPCO Holdings LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 218, 223–
24, 228–29 (D. Del. 2018) (holding that the Alice-Mayo framework inval–
idates a method patent on how to construct and operate an automobile 
driveshaft as a law of nature). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”); Mayo, 556 U.S. at 86–87; 
Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17.  
5. For a critique, see The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part 1: 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement 
of Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University). For a 
defense of the current system, see The State of Patent Eligibility in 
America: Part II: Before the S. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 116th Cong. 
(2019) (statement of David W. Jones, Exec. Dir., High Tech Inventors 
All.) (insisting that Alice-Mayo has not reduced investment in either 
biomedical or financial patents). For cases invalidating medical tests, see, 
for example, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 
LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that a medical test used 
to identify various neurological disorders is patent ineligible because the 
test is classified as a natural law and lacks a transformative element); 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (holding that a non-invasive prenatal DNA test is similarly excluded 
on patent ineligibility grounds). 
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Energy Group, LLC6 holds that a patentee is not entitled to a jury trial 
in an Article III court to determine patent validity in an infringement 
action if the defendant moves the adjudication before the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (which is staffed by administrative judges appointed 
by the head of the Patent and Trademark Office).7 Finally, eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, LLC8 imposes important limitations on the ability of 
a patent holder to obtain an injunction, even in the case of deliberate 
patent infringement.9 
The explanation for these diverse patent-restrictive decisions all 
stem in large part from the deep convictions of patent skeptics on the 
Supreme Court, backed by many industry and academic supporters, 
who believe that patent rights are to some extent second-class rights 
that are not entitled to the level of protection that is associated with 
the ownership of land, chattels, or animals, which have an indubitable 
common law heritage.10 It is important to note the rejection of this 
second-class status for patents (and copyrights) should not be regarded 
as equivalent to the proposition that these rights are absolute in all 
respects, because statements of that sort are not true of land or of any 
other forms of tangible property rights. The overall system of property 
rights is highly sensitive to the types of assets in play, even in cases 
where both assets are tangible—for example, the property rules for 
water are different from those for land. In addition, under the standard 
definitions, the exclusive rights to possession, use, and disposition11 are 
 
6. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
7. Id. at 1370–79 (“[I]nter partes review is a matter that Congress can 
properly assign to the PTO, a jury is not necessary in these proceedings.”).  
8. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
9. See id. at 390. 
10. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? 
The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in Copy Fights: 
the Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age 
43, 43–44 (Adam Thierer, Clyde Wayne Crews & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. 
eds., 2002). 
11. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945). 
In speaking about the definition of property in cases of eminent domain, 
the critical terms are “property,” “taken” and “just compensation.” It is 
conceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of 
the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights 
recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a 
more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s 
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of 
it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase, property, has been 
the latter. Id. Note that the inference is irresistible that this same set of 
rights applies to patents, which also receive eminent domain protection.  
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still subject to abridgment in cases of necessity.12 Such rights are also 
capable of transformation with changes in technology, as with the 
transformation of air rights when the upper air space, which formerly 
had no value, became useful for transformation.13 This topic deserves 
an extensive treatment of its own.14 All of these transformations may 
happen with different forms of intellectual property, but this entire 
ethos of transformation does not make sense if the exercise of the patent 
power is treated as a general right to exclude, without embracing the 
ability to alienate and license, or as a government subsidy that can be 
offered and removed at will. The originalist account does not purport 
to deal with every permutation in how patent rights are assigned and 
developed. But it does impose this important set of guard rails against 
the total elimination of patent protection by legislative or admin–
istrative action. 
Property rights in these material assets are widely regarded as 
having a natural law grounding insofar as their creation is said to 
antedate the rise of the state and its enforcement of property rights, 
which is an essential feature of the Lockean tradition under which 
property rights come from below, after which they are protected by the 
state.15 That position resonates with Madison’s general statement about 
the relationship of copyright to patent in Federalist 43, which reads: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy–
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to 
be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems 
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good 
fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The 
States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of 
the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this 
point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.16 
The common law foundations for copyright were adjudicated at 
great length in Millar v. Taylor,17 and Madison’s observation is that 
now that patents and copyrights are linked together in the same clause, 
the same level of protection for the same reason should be given to 
patents. That protection should be at the federal level because it is far 
 
12. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation 
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
13. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Swetland v. 
Curtiss Airports Corp. 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).  
14. See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Transitions Between Property Rights Regimes 
for Different Resources (forthcoming).  
15. See Palmer, supra note 10, at 58. 
16. The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison). 
17. (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303 (KB). 
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more efficient to offer intellectual property protection once throughout 
the United States instead of doing so by multiple arguably inconsistent 
state laws. Federalist No. 43 also resonates with James Madison’s short 
1792 essay in the National Gazette, Property,18 which refers to “that 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”19 Madison’s essay 
does not mention intellectual property, but it does advert to 
Blackstone’s famous definition of property in the first sentence.20 
Against that position is the famous letter of Thomas Jefferson that 
made this oft-quoted remark: “[I]t would be curious then if an idea, the 
fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be 
claimed in exclusive and stable property.”21 But if it is not the 
“fermentation” of any given mental state that is protected; it is the 
durable plan and description of the invention that derives from that 
mental effort. To be sure, natural law theory could not provide the 
institutional arrangements needed to protect intellectual property, 
which is one reason why it makes sense to call these rights “created” 
rather than “inherent.” Moreover, Edward Walterscheid is surely 
correct when he notes that the Constitution did not obligate the federal 
government to create either patent or copyright protection, but only 
authorized the creation of these rights22—which is how the text, which 
describes a power of Congress, reads. Put otherwise, there was no 
common law or constitutional right to obtain a patent, which was a 
“privilege” from the government.23 But Madison used the explicit 
 
18. James Madison, Property, Nat’l Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0238, [https://perma.cc/5BJE-
4VBF]. 
19. Id. (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *1, *2).  
20. Id. 
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). For 
a critique of Jefferson’s view, see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas 
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 959–67 (2007). Mossoff tends 
to use natural law theories in opposition to consequentialist ones. I have long 
taken the opposite view, that utilitarian justifications do not undermine the 
strength of a natural law theory. For the explicit interrelationship between 
natural law and utilitarian theory in classical theory, see Richard A. Epstein, 
The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
711 (1989). 
22. Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 Hamline L. Rev. 81, 94, 98–99 (1995). 
According to Walterscheid, Madison “intended the term ‘securing’ to mean 
‘to obtain’ or ‘to provide’ rather than ‘to insure’ or ‘to affirm and protect.’” 
Id. at 98. 
23. Id. 
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analogy between patents and copyrights to supply the intellectual 
ammunition to explain why in constitutional terms it was thought 
necessary to have a constitutional vehicle for the protection of both sets 
of rights. And it is surely noteworthy that at no time in our 
Constitution’s history has Congress ever declined the invitation to 
legislate pursuant to its constitutional power. 
It is therefore not surprising that the natural law definitions of 
property rights did influence state law protections for intellectual 
property prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The direct cases 
dealing with this issue again come from copyright law, under statutes 
that make explicit reference to the natural law tradition.24 Thus, in 1783 
Connecticut passed an “Act for the encouragement of literature and 
genius” that was explicitly rooted in natural law principles.25 The 
Massachusetts Act of the same year “for the Purpose of securing to 
Authors the exclusive Right and Benefit of publishing their Literary 
Productions for Twenty-one years,” invoked both natural rights theory 
and the desirable incentive effects of property in the same breath.26 
Similar language is found in the Virginia Law of 1785 and the New 
York Law of 1786.27 These statutes have language parallel to Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8. 
On the basis of these early decisions Paul Clement, in his recent 
article Patent Rights vs. Property,28 explicitly draws a sharp contrast 
between property rights and patent protection in order to explain and 
justify the reduced level of protection offered in recent Supreme Court 
cases, especially Oil States.29 I believe that all of those Supreme Court 
cases and similar decisions represent a serious break from a sound view 
of patents that make them a subclass of property rights—which can 
and should be enforced on a par with other forms of property rights 
once a particular patentee has received a patent grant.30 The simplest 
 
24. Id. at 88–89. 
25. 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 133–34.  
26. 1783 Mass. Acts 369. 
27. 1785 Va. Acts 8–9; 1786 N.Y. Laws 99–100. For references to these laws, 
see Randolph May & Seth L. Cooper, The Constitutional Foun–
dations of Intellectual Property: A Natural Rights Perspective 
44–46 (2015). 
28. Paul C. Clement, Patent Rights vs. Property, The Framer’s Understanding 
of Patents (2019), https://www.hightechinventors.com/post/read-former-u-
s-solicitor-general-paul-clement-s-new-paper-on-the-constitutional-purpose-
of-patents [https://perma.cc/HBH6-NZR5]. The paper was apparently pre–
pared at the behest of the High Tech Inventors Alliance. 
29. Id. at 16–17. 
30. For more discussion of these general views, see Richard A. Epstein, The 
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to 
a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455 (2010). See also Richard A. 
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statement of the argument is that under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, 
the government has the power to either grant or not grant patents in 
any particular case.31 Indeed, in 1790 the United States did not have to 
enact any Patent Act at all, but it in fact affirmatively enacted the first 
Patent Act.32 
There is, however, this huge caveat. Once the government issues a 
patent, that patent becomes—full stop—a form of property on a par 
with other forms of property, in part because the grant is in harmony 
with the natural law tradition that pervades the area.33 This claim of 
vested rights pursuant to a patent grant does not require modern 
readers to solve any deep mystery, because the language of the 1790 
Patent Act speaks in an idiom that is as easily recognized today as it 
was then. Thus, the patent is not a free grant from the government to 
whomever might request it. The grant is issued not as an act of 
government largesse but because of the work that the applicant has 
done to obtain the patent—namely, “that he, she, or they, hath or have 
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or 
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and 
praying that a patent may be granted therefor.”34 Later on in Section 
 
Epstein, What Is so Special About Intangible Property? The Case for 
Intelligent Carryovers, in Competition Policy and Patent Law 
Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation 42, 42–73 (Geoffrey A. 
Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011). 
31. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973) (“While the 
area in which Congress may act is broad, the enabling provision of Clause 
8 does not require that Congress act in regard to all categories of materials 
which meet the constitutional definitions.”). 
32. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. 
33. I have developed this theme in multiple places. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, Property Rights and Governance Strategies: How Best to Deal with 
Land, Water, Intellectual Property, and Spectrum, 14 Colo. Tech. L.J. 
181 (2016); Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to Social Welfare: 
Theoretical Principles and Practical Applications, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1743, 
1744–52 (2015) (detailing the natural law tradition with respect to property 
rights). Note that property rights in land, chattels, and animals are not 
mere usufructuary rights as Gaius wrote because agriculture, which requires 
long term investment in land, has long, to coin an expression, taken root. 
The usufructuary interest in land only applies in a hunter-gatherer society. 
Thus, by extension, patents are not usufructuary rights. See Kai Yi Xie, 
Comment, Improving the Patent System by Encouraging Intentional 
Infringement: The Beneficial Use Standard of Patents, 165 U. Penn. L. 
Rev. 1019, 1036 (2017). 
34. Patent Act of 1790 § 1 (emphasis added). The current statute is still 
intricately connected to the original 1790 Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) 
(“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). 
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2, the Act goes one step further and states that the grantee or grantees 
of the patent:  
[S]hall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary 
of State a specification in writing, containing a description, 
accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models 
(if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) 
of the thing or things, by him or them invented or 
discovered . . . .35  
The rationale for these provisions is the same as it is under the 
modern Act. A patent does give an exclusive right, and the Patent Act 
of 1790 tries to ensure that the right shall not be given away too 
cheaply. Hence, in addition to making something of value, the patent 
applicant must disclose information that allows others to use that 
invention as a template upon which they can devise some other device 
that does not fall within the scope of the patent, but nonetheless can 
compete with it in the marketplace. The exclusive right, therefore, on 
this model is not a monopoly over a given field, a point repeatedly 
recognized in the nineteenth century cases.36 It is a form of right that 
is compatible with the creation of the exclusive rights in other 
 
35. Patent Act of 1790 § 2. 
36. See, e.g., Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 442 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) 
(No. 1,434) (Swayne, Circuit Justice) (dealing with a combined thrashing 
and hulling machine). In Birdsall, Circuit Justice Swayne wrote: 
Inventors are a meritorious class of men. They are not monopolists 
in the odious sense of that term. They take nothing from the 
public. They contribute largely to its wealth and comfort. Patent 
laws are founded on the policy of giving to them remuneration for 
the fruits, enjoyed by others, of their labor and their genius. Their 
patents are their title deeds, and they should be construed in a 
fair and liberal spirit, to accomplish the purpose of the laws under 
which they are issued. 
Id. at 444. Note the use of the term “title deeds.” The case then held that 
the reissue was valid because it was a new and useful invention, and that 
it covered modifications of the machine that today would be covered by 
the doctrine of equivalents. Id. See also Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 
477 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225) (McLean, Circuit Justice) (considering 
the setting of mineral teeth on metallic plates). In Allen, Circuit Justice 
McLean writes: 
Patentees are not monopolists. . . . No exclusive right can be 
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or 
discovered. . . . [T]he law repudiates a monopoly. The right of the 
patentee entirely rests on his invention or discovery of that which 
is useful, and which was not known before. And the law gives him 
the exclusive use of the thing invented or discovered, for a few 
years, as a compensation for “his ingenuity, labor, and expense in 
producing it.” Id. at 477. 
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inventions that could be used in competition with it, just as the owner 
who has the exclusive right to one plot of land cannot thereby block his 
or her neighbor from using his or her property for a purpose that 
competes with his own. 
When these pieces are put together, it becomes clear that a grant 
is not a free gift of government. Instead it only issues if the Secretary 
of State, of War, or the Attorney General, or any two of them “shall 
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.”37 
Indeed, in the 1790 Act, some variation of the word grant (e.g. 
“grantee” or “granting”) is used ten times, and, in each case, the term 
has the same meaning that it does in ordinary English when the transfer 
of land takes place from a private grantor to a private grantee.38 The 
same term, grant, also applies to the transfer of other property rights 
in Common Law, such as the right of a patron landowner to request 
the appointment of a nominee to an ecclesiastical beneficence under old 
English law,39 and as a more modern example, the right to vest power 
to either a private trustee or a legislative body.40 At this point, the 
correct mode of interpretation is that any grantee under the act has the 
same right as any grantee in any other area. The distinctive feature 
about a patent for an invention or discovery is that the subject matter 
of the patent is in no sense in the possession of the United States prior 
to the time that the patent is granted. In this context, the “letters 
patent” issued are not identical to the transfer of, say, lands that the 
government already owns, which was the source of a huge amount of 
 
37. Patent Act of 1790 § 1. 
38. Id. §§ 1–5. 
39. See generally F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common 
Law 32–33 (Alfred H. Chaytor & William J. Whittaker eds., 1958). 
40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives.”). Note the use of the terms “granted” and 
“vested,” both property conceptions, which carry over well to public trust 
arrangements. On the close connection, see Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Robert G. Natelson & Guy I. Seideman, The Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause 52, 53 (2010). Natelson discusses several 
common principles that underlay eighteenth-century fiduciary law: 1) “The 
Duty to Follow Instructions and Remain Within Authority;” 2) “The Duties 
of Loyalty and Good Faith;” 3) “The Duty of Care;” 4) “The Duty to 
Exercise Personal Discretion;” 5) “The Duty to Account;” and 6) “The Duty 
of Impartiality.” Id. at 56–60. Elsewhere Natelson has written: “I have not 
been able to find a single public pronouncement in the constitutional debate 
contending or implying that the comparison of government officials and 
private fiduciaries was inapt. The fiduciary metaphor seems to rank just 
below ‘liberty’ and ‘republicanism’ as an element of the ideology of the day.” 
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L. 
Rev. 1077, 1086 (2004). So too with respect to grants. 
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nineteenth-century law.41 It is rather a constitutive act, which creates 
the property right because the individual in question has met the 
conditions set out in the Act. 
This historical account of patent rights as property interests has 
been also challenged by Mark Lemley, who rejects any natural-law 
foundation of patent rights.42 Indeed, his own account of the subject 
goes far afield and tentatively takes the tenuous position that patents 
should not be regarded as property rights but as subsidies granted by 
the government. He thus writes: 
Intellectual property is a form of government subsidy, designed 
to influence supply in the market away from the competitive norm 
just as support from the National Endowment of the Arts, the 
National Institutes of Health, or crop supports to farmers are. 
Recognizing this fact may be useful because it helps us to 
understand the comparison between this form of subsidy and 
other sorts of rewards, an area on which there is a burgeoning 
literature.43 
He also opines: 
The fundamental differences between intellectual property rights 
and other forms of government subsidy have to do with how the 
recipients of that subsidy are selected and the size of the subsidy 
determined. While with most government subsidies the 
government makes both choices, in the case of intellectual 
property the government leaves those decisions to the very 
market it is attempting to influence. Because many criticisms of 
government subsidies focus on size and allocation, they may not 
apply to intellectual property.44  
 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Ala. Great S.R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892) 
(“We think the contemporaneous construction thus given by the executive 
department of the government, and continued for nine years through six 
different administrations of that department—a construction which, though 
inconsistent with the literalism of the act, certainly consorts with the equities 
of the case—should be considered as decisive in this suit.”). Note that the 
course of dealing rule here was in tension with the literal interpretation. For 
a discussion of the general rules on grants, see Aditya Bamzai, The Origins 
of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017). 
Note also that the decision has important implications for Chevron v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and F.C.C. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 
U.S. 967 (2005), which take the opposite position, so that any last-minute 
shift in policy, whether or not explained, receives deference. 
42. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005). 
43. Id. at 1073–74 (emphasis in original). 
44. Id. at 1073. 
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Despite Lemley’s evident doubt about this position, the upshot is 
the same as Clement’s. Intellectual property rights, once granted, are 
not to be treated as if they were property rights entitled to strong 
constitutional protection. Instead, like other subsidies, they remain 
more malleable by far. 
Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to be suspicious of Lemley’s analogy 
between intellectual property and government subsidies. It is important 
to reject it altogether. Lemley recognizes that the analogy is at best 
imperfect because in a patent system the applicant, not the govern–
ment, secures the property right in question, so that the political 
economy of patents is different from that, say, of agricultural subsi–
dies.45 Yet what Lemley does not acknowledge is that, because of this 
massive distinction, his effort to degrade property rights into political 
subsidies falls of its own weight. But by referring to a “subsidy,” he 
misses the central point, which is that the grant of the exclusive right 
is a win/win bargain between the public and the inventor. Not so with 
subsidies. All subsidies, whether in cash or in kind, result in the transfer 
of some asset in the possession of the government to some chosen 
beneficiary who does nothing in exchange. The patent, in contrast, does 
not result from a transfer of any preexisting state asset to private 
ownership, but from the submission of an invention that meets the 
general standards of patentability. Those standards, if met, imply that 
the wealth of the nation is greater with the issuance of the patent than 
it was before. It is therefore not possible to apply the standard criticism 
of subsidies to patent creation, namely: that the tax that is imposed 
either on the general public or, as by cross-subsidy to others, unduly 
reduces the supply of the taxed good while it unduly increases the 
supply of the subsidized products, leading to a distortion that is not 
found in competitive market. That objection can be raised decisively 
against various proposals to give broad-based tax subsidies in place of 
or in addition to patents, but it cannot be raised against the granting 
of patents themselves.46  
Indeed, the view that intellectual property rights should be treated 
like subsidies recently received a decisive refutation from the United 
States Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam,47 when the Supreme Court held 
that the free speech protections that normally apply to speech also fully 
applied to Tam’s application for the name of his Rock group, “The 
 
45. See id. 
46.  See Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent Prizes 
Debate, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 303 (2013), effectively criticized in Charles 
Delmotte, The Case Against Tax Subsidies in Innovation Policy, 48 Fla. R. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2021). 
47. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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Slants.”48 Tam chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and 
“drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons.”49 
The government’s claim, a cousin of Lemley’s idea in the patent 
context, was that Tam sacrificed his constitutional rights of free speech 
by submitting his claim for the subsidy of trademark protection from 
the Patent and Trademark Office.50 The Court rejected this argument, 
explaining that, though the government spends money on trademarks, 
trademark registration is “nothing like the [subsidy] programs at issue” 
in other cases.51 Once again, the trademark bargain gives exclusive right 
to a name or mark in perpetuity52 because only with exclusivity will the 
mark give consumers information as to the origin, and through that, 
the quality of the goods purchased. There is no monopoly exclusion of 
end uses which drives the law to give only limited terms of protection 
to the user, so that it is in the social, as well as the private, interest 
that trademarks should be protected in perpetuity. Thus, the use of 
property language captures a reality that the use of subsidy language 
conveniently obscures. And it is against this general background that 
the originalist inquiry has to be undertaken. 
I. Cautious Originalism.  
In light of these efforts to undermine the status of patents, it is 
important to take a closer look at the particular components of the 
Patent Clause. In this area, the inquiry is originalist in this limited 
sense: the analysis begins with the ordinary public meaning of the text 
as understood at the time the Constitution was signed. There are many 
cases where this approach has shortcomings that should be noted at the 
outset. The first of these is that it is often the case that a text is 
incomplete because of some implicit background assumptions that must 
be brought to the fore. Thus, it could well be that some terms in a 
particular provision—like “marque” and “reprisal”—have specialized 
meanings that are well understood within the profession, but are not of 
 
48.  Id. at 1747. 
49.  Id. 
50.  See id. at 1760 (“We next address the Government’s argument that this 
case is governed by cases in which this Court has upheld the consti–
tutionality of government programs that subsidized speech expressing a 
particular viewpoint.”). 
51. Id. at 1761. 
52.  See United States Patent and Trademark Office, “What is a Trademark?” 
(last modified Sept. 25, 2020) (“A trademark registration may remain in 
force for potentially unlimited consecutive ten-year periods as long as the 
owner meets the legal requirements for post-registration maintenance and 
renewal and timely files all necessary documents.”). 
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common use.53 More fundamentally, virtually all procedural and sub–
stantive provisions of the Constitution are subject to a non-textual gloss 
that cannot be gotten or understood from parsing the text itself. For 
example, the pervasive notion of the police power in all substantive and 
procedural areas means that any particular claim may be subject to a 
set of qualifications.54 Thus, it may be wrong to abridge the freedom of 
speech, but it is not wrong to impose civil or criminal liability for 
defamation, incitement to riot, fraud, intimidation, and the like. 
That catalogue of exceptions to the free speech provision is not 
some random assortment of deviations. Rather, they all stem from the 
notion that any claim of an individual freedom is subject to limitations 
that come from the standard libertarian playbook that—in this limited 
compass at least—recognizes that speech used in aid of force or fraud 
is no more protected by the Constitution of the United States than it 
is protected by the common law.55 To that a gloss is generally added 
that makes it clear that the freedom in question is not exempt from the 
antitrust laws,56 or from general common carrier rules.57 Nor is there 
any reason why, if high transaction costs block voluntary arrangements, 
 
53. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
54. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116, 122 (1873) 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. These 
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of 
law, and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can 
only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual 
good of all . . . . This right to choose one’s calling is an essential part of 
that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, 
when chosen, is a man’s property and right. . . . A law which prohibits a 
large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following 
a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as 
well as property, without due process of law.”). For a discussion of 
limitations on police power within the takings and due process context, see 
William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 1057, 1057–58 (1980).  
55. For my views on how the process of implication should work, see generally 
Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, 53 Willamette L. Rev. 
295 (2017). 
56. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“The First 
Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the 
Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary.”). 
57. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[A] telephone 
company, being in the nature of a common carrier, was bound to render an 
equal service to all who applied and tendered the compensation fixed by law 
for the service; that while the patentees were under no obligation to license 
the use of their inventions by any public telephone company, yet, having 
done so, they were not at liberty to place restraints upon such a public 
corporation which would disable it to discharge all the duties imposed upon 
companies engaged in the discharge of duties subject to regulation by law.”). 
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it should be impermissible to use compulsory licensing schemes so long 
as just compensation is provided.  
Similarly, there is nothing in the patent clause of the Constitution 
that talks about the ability to set aside patents on the ground that they 
were obtained by improper means. Thus Section 5 of the 1790 Act 
builds that notion into the statute that allows judges to set aside any 
patent that “was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion,” 
which indicates that certain publicity and fraud-control provisions 
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution are seamlessly integrated into 
the basic structure of the 1790 Act.58 To an ardent textualist those 
inclusions might seem unauthorized, but anyone who has worked with 
statutory material under either Roman or early common law knows 
that implications of this sort were common statutory practices before 
1787, and it was understood at the founding that the Constitution, with 
its broad grants of power, must be read as subject to these implied 
limitations.59 
The point here, it must be stressed, is not an open invitation to a 
“living constitution,” which has so many degrees of freedom that at any 
point in time it is possible to turn any clause of the Constitution upside 
down.60 But the police power implications, the rules dealing with 
unconstitutional conditions, or the implied immunities are the stuff of 
everyday constitutional interpretation whose substantive contours were 
roughly the same at the time of the Founding as they are today. Why? 
Because the corrections that they authorize stem from one set of basic 
principles, which are as valid today as they were in earlier times. For a 
simple benchmark, the law of sales and partnerships surely has 
improved since Roman times, but the Romans’ central contributions to 
that body of law survive quite well in a modern setting. The reason is 
that while the subject of complex transactions may change from togas 
to spacesuits, the standard warranties of merchantability and title are 
as good today as they were in earlier times. Hence the question of 
implication, as in dealing with the rules for obtaining patent by fraud 
or material nondisclosure, follow closely to historical standards. Any 
system of originalism that seeks to rule out these elements from the 
larger picture is not faithful to the interpretive stance of the past. With 
these issues in mind, it is now useful to look closely first at the 
 
58. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.  
59. Epstein, supra note 55, at 309. Note that the method here described is 
likely compatible with “original methods originalism,” which seeks to 
understand the Constitution by employing the same interpretive methods 
which were commonly in use at the time of its ratification. See John O. 
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 
N.W. L. Rev. 751 (2009). 
60. For one modern defense, see Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 
(2011). 
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background assumptions to the Patent Clause, and then to the 
interpretive analysis of all its moving parts. 
II. Are Patents Regulated by Natural Law?  
One of the constant themes of the modern patent critics is that 
patents necessarily form a second tier of rights because they are not 
recognized at natural law. There are, of course, many statements in 
extrajudicial writings and opinions that make this point, but it is 
important to place them in context, by noting first and foremost that 
no one is claiming that these rights exist solely by natural law, but 
rather they exist because of the grants made by the United States 
pursuant to the Patents Clause. Thus, one of the most famous remarks 
of this sort is found in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, who stated:  
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. 
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from 
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may 
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to 
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or 
complaint from any body.61  
Yet that was precisely the logic that was used in the states that 
offered protection for copyrights before the adoption of the 
Constitution, which was, as noted above, a mixture of natural law that 
was always keenly aware of the incentive arguments. Clement 
understates the status of patents when he writes: 
[P]atent rights are not natural rights, they do not come from the 
common law, and they have no basis in the tradition of property 
rights tracing back to John Locke. To the contrary, a patent is a 
form of government regulation that restrains members of the 
public in the exercise of their natural rights to liberty and 
property—rights that do come from nature and are protected by 
the common law.62 
Ironically, Clement misses the huge common law component of 
patents. As Giles Rich pointed out long ago, the only thing that that 
the federal government gives through the patent grant is the right to 
exclude others from making or selling the patented invention.63 But the 
 
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 175, 181 (Henry A. Washington 
ed., 1854). 
62. Clement, supra note 28, at 1. 
63.  Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws, 24 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 159, 168 (1942) (approvingly 
quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853), in which the 
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inventor gets his own right to make and sell not from the federal 
government (with its limited powers) but from state common law that 
applies with the same force to the patented invention as it does to any 
other good or service.64 If the right to make and sell other things has a 
common law origin, and if the common law has the natural law at its 
core, then the guts of any patent licensing system has the same natural-
law origin as the rights to liberty and property that Clement concedes 
“do come from nature and are protected by the common law,” and 
which are then protected from confiscation under the federal 
Constitution.65 
In light of this history, it is simply a mistake to call patents either 
a form of government regulation or subsidy when the Patent Act treats 
them as a grant. In particular, a “restraint” does not give a party the 
right to license or sell the subject matter. It just says what the restricted 
party may not do. But clearly the value of patents comes in large 
measure from the ability to introduce them into commerce by voluntary 
transactions. On this score, I take the position, reflected in nineteenth-
century cases,66 that transacting parties to any patent deal should be 
able to attach what terms and conditions they wish on patents, so that 
the original owner can control the devolution of property rights, much 
 
Court said, “[t]he franchise which the patent grants consists altogether in 
the right to exclude every one from making, using or vending the thing 
patented without the permission of the patentee” (emphasis in original)).  
64.  See id. at 172 (describing the “[r]ights to make, use, or vend” as “‘natural’ 
or common law rights,” and going on to say that “[s]ince [these rights] do 
not involve the exercise of any right to exclude, they are not and cannot be 
the exercise of any right given by the patent statutes”). 
65. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972): 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.  
 Id. at 577. Note that the full composition of patents (and copyrights) is a 
composite of state and federal law. 
 
66. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88–89 (1902) (“The 
plaintiff, according to the finding of the referee, was at the time when 
these licenses were executed the absolute owner of the letters patent 
relating to the float spring tooth harrow business. It was, therefore, the 
owner of a monopoly recognized by the Constitution and by the statutes 
of Congress. An owner of a patent has the right to sell it or to keep it; to 
manufacture the article himself or to license others to manufacture it; to 
sell such article himself or to authorize others to sell it.”). 
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as the owner of land can do so through covenants and easements.67 To 
call these robust grants mere restrictions on the rights of others makes 
no more sense for intellectual property than it does for land grants, 
which also restrict other people from trenching on the exclusive rights 
of the grantee. Indeed, any recognition of private property necessarily 
restricts the ability of others by limiting their natural rights to wander 
unimpeded around the face of the globe.68 The simple point here is that 
Jefferson is surely right to say that patents require a government grant. 
But he has not said, nor could he say, that once the grant is given 
patents are not protected to the same degree as common law rights of 
property. The positive law, as it were, has filled any gap in the common 
law. 
Clement, Lemley, and others writing from this point of view are 
also wrong to think that the natural-law tradition at common law does 
not have the same utilitarian foundations as it does for patent law. For 
starters, the only reason why patents cannot be property rights “in 
nature” is that nature does not have social institutions that allow for 
these rights to be defined, recorded, and enforced. Indeed, early on, 
without the existence of reproducible technologies, there would be no 
reason for a patent law at all. But by the same token, it must be 
observed that in a state of nature the property rights that are obtained 
by occupation—first possession—of things that were unowned in the 
state nature did not follow from any ineluctable law that said such 
forms of property had to be recognized.69 There is indeed a huge, long-
standing literature that attacks the very notion that any given 
individual can use his unilateral power of possession to subject some–
thing to private ownership without the consent of others.70 Thus, many 
 
67. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical 
Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 503–08 
(2010). The case law tends to run the other way, as in Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637–38 (2007) (adopting the 
“exhaustion” doctrine to bar patentee’s suit against the subsequent lawful 
purchaser of the patented item). 
68. For a discussion of these parallels, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 
San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2005). 
69. For the basic texts, see G. Inst. 2.66 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson 
trans., 1988); J. Inst. 2.1.12 (J. B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913). 
70. See, e.g., Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of 
an Idea 130, 154 (1951) (“In fact, the ‘own’ which the laws of property 
protect is whatever an individual has managed to get hold of, and equality 
of right, applied to property, means only that every man has an equal right 
to grab. . . . The problem, then, was to show how it came about that when 
one man took a portion of the common stock, the rest of mankind was 
obliged to respect that portion as his private property.”). See also 
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people erroneously think that the occupation of any tract of land is a 
usurpation of the rights of others to use that property. This mistake 
finds its precise analogue in Clement’s work when he claims: 
The Supreme Court has also been a consistent voice in the chorus 
stressing that patents represent a derogation from the traditional 
rights of others to use their property and energies in economic 
pursuits free from government-imposed monopolies. As the Court 
put it in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 
315, 370 (1888), “[t]he United States, by issuing the patents . . . , 
has taken from the public rights of immense value, and bestowed 
them upon the patentee. In this respect the government and its 
officers are acting as the agents of the people, and have, under 
the authority of law vested in them, taken from the people this 
valuable privilege, and conferred it as an exclusive right upon the 
patentee.” Thus, the Court has long explained that unlike 
traditional forms of property, patents find their justification only 
in the benefits they contribute to the public—and that the rights 
of a patent holder should therefore be defined so as to maximize 
the benefit to the public.71 
Hence his claim—that patent rights are somehow “unlike 
traditional property rights” insofar as they need a utilitarian 
justification while property rights in land do not—is to wholly 
misunderstand the intellectual history of private property rights. As I 
wrote many years ago, it is a mistake to think that natural law rights 
somehow survive and prosper even though they have no utilitarian 
foundations.72 The truth is quite the opposite: the creation of exclusive 
rights in land works, because once agriculture becomes the dominant 
means of production, it is necessary to have permanent rights in land 
in order for people who sow to know that they will be able to reap—a 
point well understood by Blackstone.73 The only way in which this can 
be done is to give secure property rights to others to treat the entire 
earth as a common open to their use. Clement writes: 
That condition underscores what the Framers and their forebears 
well understood: patent rights are not natural rights, they do not 
come from the common law, and they have no basis in the 
tradition of property rights tracing back to John Locke. To the 
 
Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophical Foun–
dations (1977). 
71. Clement, supra note 28, at 8. See infra pp. 727–28 for a discussion on the 
inexact equivalence of exclusive rights compared to monopolies. 
72. See generally Epstein, supra note 21 (explaining that the connection be–
tween natural rights and utilitarian concerns has faded over time).  
73. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *6–7.  
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contrary, a patent is a form of government regulation that 
restrains members of the public in the exercise of their natural 
rights to liberty and property—rights that do come from nature 
and are protected by the common law.74 
Clement misses the close parallelism between the law of land and 
the law of intellectual property, because private ownership of land 
restricts the ability of others in the exercise of the natural rights to 
move across areas, and the general proposition here is that the necessity 
of privatization to give incentive to develop works as much for land as 
it does for intellectual property.75 The basic conceit is that the overall 
improvements in product are so vast that one does not have to worry 
about any distributional constraint—precisely because the right of 
occupation is open to all individuals and thus does not obviously favor 
one person over another. Clearly this assumption can be subject to 
attack as human density increases, but there is little doubt that the so-
called natural law uses the same arguments to get private property 
rights in land as it does for intellectual property. That is as utilitarian 
as it gets. 
It is also worth noting that utilitarian theories fully understand 
that regimes of private ownership cannot extend to all physical 
elements. Early on in Book II of Justinian’s Institutes, for example, he 
recognizes a class of common property—water, air, the beach—that 
cannot be reduced to private ownership.76 And it is only on utilitarian 
grounds that it is possible to explain why this distinction is drawn in 
the way it is, and why it continues to endure to this very day. Rivers 
and trails and highways are long and skinny, and they are only of value 
if they allow people to commute from one place to another. Hence where 
the risks of holdout are high, property rights tend to be held in common, 
with narrow exceptions made for private use—you may take refuge on 
the beach during a storm.77 But where the need for production is 
greater, private property with the right to exclude becomes the 
dominant mode—again with exceptions in cases of necessity where one 
person might take refuge in the hut or the dock of another in times of 
stress. Exactly that distribution of rights exists for intellectual 
property, for all the individual branches like patents and copyrights 
presuppose that there is a core of public domain elements.78 The parallel 
 
74. Clement, supra note 28, at 1. 
75. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 16.  
76. J. Inst. 2.1.pr. to 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913). 
77. See id. at 2.1.5; see also John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity 
and the Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 651, 655–62 (2007). 
78. For discussion of the parallels, see Richard A. Epstein, The Basic Structure 
of Intellectual Property Law, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Intellectual Property Law 24, 27–29 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine 
Pila eds., 2018). 
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structures in both areas make it quite clear that intellectual property 
rights are indeed full-fledged property rights, for which full protection 
is appropriate. 
III. The Particulars of the Patent Clause 
This general orientation sets the stage for an examination of the 
various parts of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.  
A. To Promote the Progress of Sciences and the Useful Arts.  
The opening words of the Patent Clause are “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,”79 which clearly operates as a limit–
ation on the overall scope of the grant. The use of the phrase “useful 
[a]rts” is a cross between ordinary English and established historical 
practice. In particular, it has been written that the notion of useful art 
is bound up with the Greek term “techne,” which appears to cover at 
the very least such skills as architecture and mechanical drawing, and 
which is evoked when patent law refers to “persons having ordinary 
skill in the art” (often abbreviated as PHOSITA)—a general test that 
is not, and cannot be, tied to any particular field.80 Yet it is not only 
important to figure out what these initial words include, but also to 
gain some sense of what they exclude. The strongest evidence comes 
from Adam Mossoff, who explains that the Crown granted patents for 
exclusive rights for many reasons that had nothing to do with the 
promotion of either invention or the useful arts.81 Most notably, patents 
could be (and were) used to secure to private parties exclusive rights to 
 
79. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
80. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 Yale L.J. 1590, 1604 (2011); see Karl B. Lutz, Patents 
and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
32 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 83, 87 (1950); Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” 
of the Patent System, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1397, 1401–06 (2015). O’Connor 
notes: “Useful arts” originally referred to the practical skills and methods 
of manufacture and craftsmanship taught as vocational subjects (i.e., ways 
of making) as distinct from “liberal arts” which were academic subjects 
taught for intellectual development (i.e., ways of thinking). Id. 
 For an exhaustive modern explanation of the relationship between art and 
techne, see id. at 1399. (“The intellectual worldview in the West long 
distinguished the mechanical arts from both sciences and liberal arts (and 
later the fine arts). Patent systems emerged during the Renaissance to 
incentivize invention, disclosure, and commercialization of advances in the 
‘useful’ (i.e., practical, mechanical) arts. In the United States, Madison and 
the Framers likely relied in substantial part on the famous French 
Encyclopédie construction of ‘art’ as artisanal skill to authorize Congress to 
grant exclusive rights to promote the progress of such skills.”). 
81. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1259–64 (2001). 
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import certain goods from overseas for sale in the United Kingdom.82 
These patents were in no sense a quid pro quo for any invention or 
discovery; the patents were for things that had already been invented 
and discovered.83 Accordingly, these transactions did not secure the 
advancement of human knowledge and well-being by rewarding private 
parties for their new inventions and discoveries. Mossoff offers an 
account of how Queen Elizabeth I issued patents that were in fact 
complex bargains with private individuals, whereby a party who 
received a letters patent from the Crown got the exclusive right to 
introduce the new substance into the realm in ways that did not conflict 
with established industries, and which served to train apprentices to 
work in the relevant field.84 This theme is a variation on policies for the 
protection of infant industries. The practice also created the ability to 
create monopoly rents, which was not offset by any technological 
advance. As Mossoff writes,  
[L]etters patent had nothing to do with legal rights or even 
inventions per se, but rather they represented royal privileges that 
supported royal policies. In this case, the royal policy was the 
introduction of new industries and manufactures to the realm, 
and the royal privilege was a monopoly grant ascertained through 
a letter patent.85 
Economically, the exclusive franchise for importation should be 
regarded as an alternative technique for the Crown to raise revenues by 
imposing tariffs on goods imported from abroad, but that simple taxing 
tool did not have the complex effects associated with the conditions 
attached to the letters patent.86 The use of the introductory phrase, 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is thus best 
understood as an effort to prevent the use of patents as a franchise tool 
or revenue device that would distort the competitive processes in the 
United States. None of the patents issued under the Patent Act of 1790 
 
82. Id. at 1259–60. 
83. See id. at 1259–61; Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual 
Origins of American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 18 
(2016). 
84. Mossoff, supra note 81, at 1261–63.  
85. Id. at 1261. 
86. See id. at 1259–64; see also Alfred Rive, A Brief History of Regulation and 
Taxation of Tobacco in England, 9 Wm. & Mary Q. 1, 4–5 (1929); Stephen 
D. Billington, Patent Costs and the Value of Inventions: Explaining Patent–
ing Behaviour between England, Ireland and Scotland, 1617–1852, at 9 
(Queen’s University Centre for Economic History, Working Paper No. 
2018–10, 2018), http://www.quceh.org.uk/uploads/1/0/5/5/10558478/wp 
18-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8CP-K7X2] (refuting that patents were 
primarily meant to provide revenue to the Crown).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patent Originalism 
720 
had anything to do with franchises issued to importers,87 for the 
language of the statute tracks the language of the Patent Clause insofar 
as it is limited to people who “have invented or discovered any useful 
art.”88 There could be some difficulty in figuring out the range of useful 
arts, which from the scientific context, like draftsmanship and model 
building, probably did not mean to include literature or the decorative 
or dramatic arts within the scope of the constitutional grant, general 
literary and artistic endeavors are protected as writings. 
Yet the one position that is surely incorrect is the suggestion that 
this initial limitation in any way was meant to express any form of 
disfavor to those patents covered by the 1790 Act, all of which remain 
comfortably protected within the confines of the constitutional 
provision. Paul Clement seriously misreads the clause when he writes: 
The patent system must “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts,” rather than the private advantage of inventors and 
speculators who do more to impede than to advance such 
progress. Particularly problematic are systemic flaws that lead 
the government to issue scores of patents that serve no legitimate 
end.89 
His fanciful reference to inventors and speculators is intended to 
plant the suggestion that somehow a large subset of persons who meet 
the requirements of the 1790 Patent Act should be condemned if they 
fall into the latter category. But the short answer to this contention is 
that the substantive requirements to obtain a patent supply all the 
indicia that the patent granted is one that serves a sensible social 
purpose. Therefore, uncertainty cuts in both directions, so that the 
Clause could be read to indicate an uneasiness about using ad hoc tools 
to block sensible patents that indeed do advance the useful arts. 
More concretely, there are no useful inventions or improvements 
thereon that surreptitiously create some form of illicit speculative 
gamble. Indeed, Section 6 of the Patent Act does not restrict the parties 
who can bring the action to the patentees, but it also includes executors 
and administrators to cover cases where the patent passes either by will 
or intestacy, or by assignment, which can take place by contract during 
life, in much the same way as any other asset could be transferred.90 
The basic theory is the same as it is for all other forms of property, 
which is that assignment is encouraged because it tends to move any 
 
87. See Bracha, supra note 83, at 220.  
88. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–11. 
89. Clement, supra note 28, at 2. 
90. Patent Act of 1790 § 6. 
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asset, patents included, from a lower to a higher use.91 There is through–
out the patent law a studious effort, fully evidenced in the 1790 Act, 
which conditions the grant of a patent on some showing that it will find 
commercial success or turn a profit for its owner.92 Clearly the inventors 
are not likely to patent various devices if they have no commercial 
value, so the system of self-selection is what determines which subjects 
get patented and which do not. It is a grossly misleading statement to 
assume that the introductory clause, which was designed to deal with 
patents to non-inventors, is somehow there in order to prevent “the 
government [from] issu[ing] scores of patents that serve no legitimate 
end,” a claim for which Clement offers no evidence of any kind.93 
Nor is it accurate to claim, as Clement does, that the initial clause 
should shape the way the Patent Clause should be read because Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 8 “is alone among Congress’ enumerated powers in 
that the Framers conditioned it on the performance of a specific public 
purpose.”94 Those patents that are issued in accordance with the norms 
stated in the statute satisfy that test, and meet that purpose. The 
patent law operates at the wholesale level, and does not impose any 
special limitations to eliminate certain patents on the kinds of grounds 
that Clement nowhere specifies. Indeed, the proposition that the system 
is rife with dubious patents has been attacked powerfully in many 
articles.95 The creation of this patent system itself is imbued with a 
critical social purpose. Indeed, the great danger is that if excessive limits 
are imposed on patent grants, the system will fail its great social 
purpose, as many valid patents will be unfairly invalidated or given in–
sufficient remedial protection, which is what happens with Alice/Mayo 
on the one side, and eBay on the other.96 Nothing suggests that the 
 
91. See Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J.L. & Econ. 
61, 62 (1966). 
92. Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 2, 4; see Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent 
Law, 5 Q.J. Economics 44, 61–64 (1890).  
93. Clement, supra note 28, at 2. 
94. Id. at 6–7. 
95. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881, 
883 (2015) (“Importantly, more opportunities to challenge issued patents 
also means more opportunities to engage in abusive practices to undermine 
legitimate patent rights.”). Dolin then shows how the efforts to rid the 
system of low-quality patents ignore the costs of its cure. Id. at 897–99. 
96. Id. at 882–83; Edward Van Gieson & Paul Stellman, Killing Good Patents 
to Wipe out Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter 
Rules, and the Inability to Save Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute, 
27 Santa Clara Comput. & High Tech. L.J. 403, 439 (2010); Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212, 216–18, 225–26 (2014); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–73, 
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introductory phrase of the Patent Clause was intended to signal that 
patents are less than full-fledged property rights. 
B. “By securing . . . the exclusive right.”  
The second component of the Patent Clause provides for “securing” 
exclusive rights for authors and inventors. The question here is what 
meaning should be attached to that phrase. Start with the term 
“security,” whose standard definition connotes freedom from risk, fear, 
or anxiety, typically without specifying either the interest to be 
protected or the source of the threat.97 More concretely for these 
purposes, the term in the eighteenth century was closely associated with 
the security of possession.98 That notion is prominent in the writings of 
David Hume, who writes: “[I]t is well known, that men’s happiness 
consists not so much in an abundance of [the commodities and 
enjoyments of life], as in the peace and security with which they possess 
them.”99 Or elsewhere: “Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is 
produced or improved by a man’s art or industry ought, for ever, to be 
secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such useful habits 
and accomplishments?”100 
The point here is simple enough. If persons do not have the security 
of possession, then others are able to take what they have with impunity 
and turn it to their own advantage, until they too are forced out of 
their possession. The issue was so important historically that it was 
commonly said that the protection of real estate was heavily organized 
around the notion of possession. An example is the writ novel disseisin 
(recent dispossession), which allowed the party dispossessed of property 
to regain it from the party who took it without having to show owner–
ship of the property in question.101 That tension between possession and 
 
77–78, 82, 87, 92 (2012); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
391–94 (2006). 
97. See, e.g., Security, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse 
/security [https://perma.cc/E6F5-G27S] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020); 
Security, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/security [https://perma.cc/YCP2-EDB6] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
98. See 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 
(4th ed. 1777). 
99. 1 David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects 49 (n. ed. 
1825) (1742).  
100. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 28 
(1751). 
101. Maitland, supra note 39, at 22–23. The so-called possessory assizes also 
included mort d’ancestor, which allowed the descendant of the decedent to 
recover possession of the land from an interloper who took possession of it 
after the death of the ancestor but before the ancestor could enter the 
property in possession. Id. at 22–25. 
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ownership was demonstrated by the proposition that in novel disseisin 
it was not part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case to show that he had a 
higher title to the property.102 The use of an expeditious remedy to 
restore possession had the great advantage that in most cases it put an 
end to the dispute, for in the large run of cases the party in possession 
was also the true owner of the property in dispute.103 The simplification 
thus allowed the true owner to win while sparing him the need to trace 
back title to some indisputable grant, such as one from the Crown. And 
in those where the title was in dispute, the dispossessor could, after he 
was required to surrender position, maintain an action called the Writ 
of Right to establish that superior title in the few cases where ownership 
and possession were separated.104 
Note that in all these cases the remedy for the dispossession was 
the return of the possession.105 It was never the case that the party who 
was forced off the land was told to make do with a sum of money that 
represented the fair market value of the property in question. These 
private forced purchases would have routinely circumvented voluntary 
market transactions, leaving the true owner out in the cold with a 
genuine uncertainty of whether he would be paid in due course a 
suitable amount, which is hard to determine with land because of its 
inherent subjective value. Damages are thus a wholly inadequate 
remedy, and the widescale situation in which dispossession routinely 
occurs is ample evidence that the security of possession is necessary for 
civil peace in society. 
To be sure, over time, the notion of “clean-up” damage for the loss 
of interim use, or for the partial destruction of the property in question, 
was made part of the overall picture.106 And surely if dispossession was 
followed by the destruction of structures or the removal of valuable 
minerals, a full system of rewards would have to strip the defendant of 
those gains in order to make sure that this willful circumvention of the 
legal rules did not have disastrous collateral consequences.107 Thus it is 
often the case that a mixture of injunctive relief and damages is 
 
102. See id. at 22–23. 
103. See Tessa Shepperson, The Petty Assizes and the Development of the Jury 
System, Hist. L. Blog, http://historyoflaw.co.uk/petty-assizes-develop 
ment-of-jury-system/ [https://perma.cc/G22P-MS5N] (last visited Oct. 
10, 2020). 
104. Id.; Maitland, supra note 39, at 23–24. 
105. See Maitland, supra note 39, at 22–25. 
106. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of 
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 909, 915–16 (2007). 
107. See A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 
100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 320, 349–52 (1951); see also Wooden-ware Co. v. United 
States, 106 U.S. 432, 434, 437 (1882). 
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required, so that it becomes a mistake to follow the analysis of Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, who posit that injunctions and 
damages are opposites, not complements, in particular cases, and then 
proceed to show the serious holdout questions that arise from 
injunctions and the risks of misappropriations that arise from 
damages.108 As I have written elsewhere: 
[U]nlike the oversimplified model of damages versus injunctive 
relief developed by Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed, the use of injunctions and damages are more often 
complements than substitutes. The injunctive side of the equation 
allows for conditional injunctions, bound by levels and time of 
emissions. The damage side picks up the slack where the 
injunctive relief backs off. By starting with the former and moving 
cautiously to the latter, the total level of dislocations is far lower 
than moving to a corner position in which one of these remedies 
is adopted to the exclusion of the other.109 
This discussion sets the stage for the protection of patents. It is 
commonly understood that intellectual property is in some sense a non-
rivalrous good.110 Unlike the situation with land, an invention can be 
used both by the party who owns it and by some outsider. The use by 
the second party, or indeed any number of second parties, does not 
prevent any person from using it himself. This argument has often been 
used to suggest that no patent protection is needed at all, because so 
long as the owner is not forced to abandon use of the patented 
technology, why worry if someone else uses it?111 Yet that argument 
does not meet the constitutional standard, because the Constitution is 
not limited to protecting the right of an inventor to use his own 
inventions. It also protects the exclusive right to those inventions, which 
presumptively means that no one else is allowed to use that invention 
in another physical instantiation without the permission of the owner. 
 
108. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 
1115–23 (1972). 
109. Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real Estate 
Development, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1493, 1509 (2018) (footnotes omitted). 
110. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: 
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property 
Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771, 1797 (2006). 
111. See Stan Liebowitz, Intellectual Property, Libr. Econ. & Liberty, https:// 
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IntellectualProperty.html [https://perma.cc/ 
P9N5-ZY6U] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); Brink Lindsey & Daniel Takash, 
Why “Intellectual Property” is a Misnomer, Niskanen Ctr., Sept. 10, 2019, 
at 5–8, 10–13, https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 
09/LT_IPMisnomer-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ8F-C8T6]. 
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Clearly, that exclusive element really matters, for if others are 
entitled to use the invention freely, then they are also free to sell it to 
other individuals, who can also make use of the technology without 
denying to its owner the right to exclusive use. In their paper, Why 
‘Intellectual Property’ is a Misnomer,112 Brink Lindsey and Daniel 
Takash take the position that I can still sing a tune that I wrote even 
if my neighbor may sing it as well.113 That is clearly a case of copyright, 
and it is worth noting that nobody who has ever sold sheet music or 
records has insisted that the party who buys it never sing the song 
privately—a total absurdity, as holding one liable for copyright 
infringement for a public performance lies at the heart of copyright 
violations.114 Rather, the expectation is that the gains from sale will be 
increased if the buyer is entitled to make that private use. Indeed, the 
social expectation with songs is that the exclusive right of copyright 
never prevents that from taking place. 
But there are two decisive objections to this example. The first is 
that it is quite a different proposition if the outsider goes into the 
business of selling sheet music or recordings himself. He can prepare 
these at a lower cost than the original composer because he need not 
incur the cost of composition, but only the costs of selling the completed 
work. This creates a complete inversion in the marketplace, where the 
returns from sale are greater for the interloper than for the original 
composer. Exactly the same thing takes place with inventions. Absent 
patent protection, commercialization for sales to third parties is more 
cheaply done by the infringer than by the inventor—which clearly has 
massive impacts on the willingness to create the invention in the first 
place.115 And, unlike the copyright, inventions do not have that nice 
feature that everyone can sing along. It is of course the case that you 
can lend your patented tool to your neighbor, which increases the 
amount that can be commanded on the original sale. But again, the 
right of commercialization—making a new article of that same tool for 
sale by the non-inventor—is the death knell to an invention because it 
puts the inventor at a systematic disadvantage to the interloper. 
Lindsey and Takash wholly ignore this important competitive situation. 
At this point, it becomes clear why the Patent Clause refers to 
exclusive rights: it is only that configuration that allows the inventor 
(or assignee) to sue for an injunction that stops unauthorized commer–
cialization and prevents the collapse of innovation in product and 
service markets. Once the injunction is in place, it means the interloper 
 
112. Lindsey & Takash, supra note 111. 
113. Id. at 5–7. 
114. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2018) (containing exten–
sive provisions that govern various kinds of public performances). 
115. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual 
Property Rights Skepticism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 103, 147 (2016). 
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presumptively can be stopped from making or selling the infringing 
product, which is the first step in stopping the loss of patent rights. 
But injunctions in patent cases have to share many of the attributes 
that they have in nuisance and other cases, because they cannot be 
considered automatically proper in the full range of cases. For example, 
injunctions are often insufficient in those cases in which the inventor is 
unaware that some infringing goods have already been sold to third 
persons who may or may not know about their infringing nature. 
At this point, it is quite clear that the constitutional text does not 
offer a complete guide as to what remedial choices are appropriate. That 
point is recognized by Section 4 of the Patent Act of 1790, which 
contains additional remedies that explicitly vindicate “the sole and 
exclusive right” of the patentee and various assignees by holding that: 
[E]very person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said 
patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators 
or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and more–
over shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so 
devised, made, constructed, used, employed or vended, contrary 
to the true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action 
on the case founded on this act.116 
These non-injunctive remedies were, if anything, strengthened in 
both the 1793 Patent Act which allowed at least three times the 
standard royalties,117 and in the 1800 Patent Act which allowed for “a 
sum equal to three times the actual damage sustained.”118 This tighten–
ing set of damage awards is flatly inconsistent with the view that the 
Framers treated patent rights as second-class rights. Indeed, the 
purpose of all these damages is to replicate the same objective that is 
sought in cases of willful conversion of tangible objects, where the willful 
wrongdoer is forced to turn over the compensation that he receives 
without getting any offset for the costs needed to produce the object in 
question.119 The purpose of this rule is to create strong incentives not 
to take property by making sure the willful infringer is always left worse 
off after the breach than if no breach had occurred at all.120 The rule 
was different in cases of innocent conversion—that is, those situations 
where there was an intention to take the property in question, but in 
 
116. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111. 
117. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, Stat. 318, 322 (“[A] sum, that shall be at 
least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold 
or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention . . . .”). 
118. Patent Act of 1800, ch. 26, § 3, 2 Stat 37, 38. 
119. See, e.g., Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434–37 (1882); 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928–29 (2016). 
120. Wooden-Ware Co., 106 U.S. at 437; Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1928–29.  
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the honest belief that the taker was either the owner of the property or 
had received a license from the owner to take the goods in question. 
There, deterrence is not an issue, so the emphasis switches to ensuring 
that the owner of the property is not unjustly enriched by the innocent 
contribution of the good faith improver.121 
These rules are well-entrenched for physical property, but it is 
unclear from the text of Section 4 whether some adjustments in the 
remedial structure should be taken in the few cases of innocent 
infringement. It is, in contrast, clear that while the 1790 Patent Act 
does not refer to an injunction, it can hardly be said by way of gloss 
that this remedy should be ruled out of bounds as a matter of course 
just because damages and seizure of goods exist as potential remedies 
for all cases. At this point it is instructive to note that in Article III, 
Section 2, it says that “[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties,” which surely covers cases 
under the 1790 Patent Act.122 This Clause also makes it clear that an 
injunction, as a close substitute to the statutory provisions under 
Section 4, should be allowed to achieve the same end as the statutory 
remedies in Section 4. It is equally clear that subsequent statutes are 
well within the constitutional ambit when they offer injunctive relief as 
part of the standard suite of equitable remedies for any continuing 
violation of a property right, in parallel to the copyright decision in 
Morse v. Reid.123 Thus the key provision of 35 U.S.C. § 283 rounds out 
the circle when it says: 
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title 
may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity 
to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such 
terms as the court deems reasonable. 
The sensible way to read this provision is to follow the general 
principles of equity by starting with the use of the injunction, which is 
in turn modified to take into account exceptional circumstances. An 
innocent manufacturer, in good faith, could receive the right to sell 
goods already made. For example, the manufacturer could be allowed 
to sell existing stock in exchange for the payment of a higher-than-usual 
royalty within some limited period, even if it is prohibited from making 
 
121. See Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 40 
& Illus. 14 (Am. Law Inst. 2011); Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 313–
14 (1871). 
122. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Patent Act of 1790 § 4. 
123. See supra notes 116–118; Morse v. Reed, 17 F. Cas. 873, 873 (C.C.D.N.Y. 
1796) (Case No. 9,860); see also John D. Gordan, III, The First Reported 
Federal Copyright Case, 11 L. & Hist. Rev. 21, 22 (1993). 
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new items within the same class. (That option appears to be foreclosed 
under the 1790 Act.) At this point the infringer has the opportunity to 
redesign the infringing product to eliminate its infringing conditions. 
But these “principles of equity”124 are not meant to repeal the basic rule 
that enjoins direct competition from an infringer. Accordingly, the rule 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. bears no relation to the tests for 
injunctions needed to protect the patent’s exclusive right. The eBay 
test is as follows: 
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-
factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must 
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering 
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.125 
The exact origin of this test is somewhat mysterious because it is 
not anchored in any reference to earlier practice. Indeed, earlier practice 
proceeded along very different lines.126 The first two provisions invert 
the correct analysis, which starts with the presumption that the 
injunction is the remedy of course and then limits that remedy to avoid 
any possible abuse of right. This presumption is warranted because 
damages alone are always inadequate as a sole remedy to deal with 
future, deliberate patent violations uncertain in scope and severity. 
Damages reduce the status of the patent holder to that of an unsecured 
creditor seeking payment that could take years to collect from a party 
who could, in the interim, secrete assets elsewhere or go out of business. 
The third eBay factor compounds the blunder when it introduces a 
balance-of-hardships test, which formed no part of any of the earlier 
rules that treated actual damages, multiples of actual damages, and 
forfeiture of goods as routine remedies. Hardship may allow for marginal 
adjustments in the timing and scope of the remedy, but that approach 
never revisits the question of whether “a remedy in equity” is warr–
anted, when the norm is that such is routinely allowed. And the fourth 
factor introduces the wild card of the “public interest” on a case-by-
case basis, which is contrary to the working presumption that the 
advancement of knowledge secured by patents makes their protection a 
matter of the highest public interest. On the proper view, it would take 
some dire public necessity—when all property rights are routinely 
 
124. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  
126. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of 
Petitioners at 2–3, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 
05-130), 2006 WL 1785363. 
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abridged for the duration of the necessity—to suspend the injunction. 
It should therefore be painfully clear that Paul Clement gets matters 
grievously out of whack when he writes: 
The government has taken a number of steps to address the 
problems outlined above. These developments include Congress’ 
decision in 2011 to enact inter partes review, which makes it easier 
for the PTO to identify and cancel patents that were issued in 
error, and the Supreme Court’s decision in [eBay,] which ensures 
that patents do not receive favorable treatment compared to 
traditional property rights when seeking injunctions in court. 
Together these developments help bring the patent system 
somewhat closer to the constitutional vision the Framers had for 
it.127 
At this point Clement defends the Supreme Court decision in Oil 
States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,128 which 
allows for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reexamine patents 
after they have been issued.129 I have critiqued Justice Thomas’s opinion 
in great detail elsewhere, concluding that he misread every case he cited 
in Oil States.130 Suffice it to say that the 1790 Act recognized that 
patents were grants from the United States government. These grants, 
like grants of real property, vest at the time that they are made, so that 
the only way in which they can be set aside is in a judicial forum by 
showing some defect in their formation. Justice Thomas sought to 
deflect that conclusion by insisting that patents should be regarded as 
public rights under the doctrine of Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
& Improvement Co.131 Murray’s Lessee applied the public rights doc–
trine to customs disputes and extended it to cover any case in which a 
property right had been created pursuant to statute, including, of 
 
127. Clement, supra note 28, at 16 (internal citation omitted). 
128. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
129. Id. at 1371–72, 1374. 
130. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Post-
Decision Article: Inter Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the 
Structural Protections Offered by Article III Courts, 19 Federalist Soc’y 
Rev. 132 (2018). For two earlier companion pieces, see Richard A. Epstein, 
The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Pre-Argument Article: Why 
the Supreme Court Should End Inter Partes Review in Oil States, 19 
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 116 (2018); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme 
Court Tackles Patent Reform: Post-Argument Article: Further Reflections 
on the Oil States Case after Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court, 19 
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 124 (2018). 
131. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856); Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 
1373–74 (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284). 
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course, patents.132 By Justice Thomas’s logic, the entire judicial system 
could be ousted in all patent disputes, not just at the trial level but 
also on all appeals. Yet clearly the judicial power must cover statutory 
causes of action, for the entire system of separation of powers is at an 
end if the resolution of all disputes arising under statute can be removed 
to administrative tribunals that have none of the safeguards of Article 
III courts. 
To reach his result, Justice Thomas gave a highly inaccurate 
account of the relevant precedents, which all held that once the grant—
whether of land or a patent—was final, it could be set aside only in a 
judicial proceeding.133 Thus, the Supreme Court in McCormick 
Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman134 could not have been more 
explicit when it wrote: 
 It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that 
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of the 
Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, and has 
had affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has passed beyond 
the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be 
revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the 
Government. United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States 
v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363. It has become the 
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal 
protection as other property. Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; 
Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225; United States v. Palmer, 128 
U.S. 262, 271, citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356.  
 The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to 
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the 
courts of the United States, and not in the department which 
issued the patent. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533; United 
States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364; Michigan 
Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589, 593. And in this 
respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and 
is subject to the same limitations as a patent for a grant of 
lands.135 
All of the cited cases stand for the propositions cited, and Justice 
Thomas was plainly wrong to treat those decisions as though they were 
 
132. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284–85.  
133. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376 (citing McCormick Harvesting 
Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898); United States v. Am. Bell 
Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364, 371 (1888)).  
134. 169 U.S. 606 (1898). 
135. Id. at 608–09. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patent Originalism 
731 
quirks of the Patent Act of 1870.136 Rather, the principle that patent 
grants confer property rights unalterable by administrative agencies is 
a general one that applies to all transactions, regardless of which 
particular patent statute is in effect at any given time. “But those cases 
were decided under the Patent Act of 1870.”137 His reasoning gets it 
exactly backwards. The Patent Act of 1870 did not include such a 
provision because it was widely understood that such a provision was 
unconstitutional. Oil States was wrongly decided precisely because it 
rejected the notion that patent grants create exclusive property rights, 
just as was intended by the constitutional Framers. 
C. Limited Terms. 
The last relevant feature of the constitutional design for patents is 
the requirement that these patents be only for limited terms.138 That 
limitation was inserted because it tracked past practices for patents. 
The source of the limitation is both simple and profound. A patent, by 
creating an exclusive right, does limit the use of a given invention; this 
counts as a social loss offset by the incentive to invent. It should be 
stressed that an exclusive right is not a monopoly unless there are no 
close substitutes for an invention, just as the exclusive right to 100 
Main Street does not make it the only house in town. And the patent 
law is so structured that one cannot patent a field but only an 
invention, which leaves the way open for new entrants who can take 
advantage of the knowledge that the successful patentee had to include 
in his patent application.139 The existence of an exclusive right does not, 
of course, eliminate the prospect that the holder of the device will 
receive Ricardian rents, which are always obtainable in competitive 
markets, by obtaining some of its inputs at below-market prices.140 This 
 
136. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376 (“That version of the Patent 
Act did not include any provision for post-issuance administrative review.”). 
137. Id.  
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
139. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/gen 
eral-information-concerning-patents#heading-4 [https://perma.cc/7HCB 
-TN2L]. 
140. Suppose there are two parties who own coal, one of whose coal is close to 
the surface and therefore easy to extract at a cost of $10. The other’s coal 
lies deeper and can be extracted at the cost of $20. If the price of coal is $25, 
the first earns $10 in Ricardian rents that the second does not, but both sell 
at the competitive price of say, $25. The situation is quite different if all coal 
miners could agree on a price of $30, which would create distortions. Note 
that if the first party sells his property to another, the sales price will include 
the present discounted value of the future Ricardian rents from the property 
so that his buyer will only earn the normal competitive rate of return. Note 
also that Ricardian rents do not create an umbrella for new entry, but 
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point seems implicitly acknowledged in the nineteenth-century cases 
that distinguished between exclusive rights, which are usually pro-
competitive, and monopoly power, which is definitionally anti-compet–
itive.141 
Yet there are cases in which the new patented object does not face 
any direct competitors, and thus will be able to extract a set of 
monopoly rents. The limitation of terms is a limit on that power as 
well: after the time has run, others can make the invention so that the 
original patentee forgoes the initial benefit of his exclusive right. The 
exact period of time is not specified in the Constitution, but it seems 
clear that a limited term cannot be, say, a million years, which is 
functionally indistinguishable from perpetual ownership. The 1790 
Patent Act set the term at a maximum of fourteen years, with no 
allowance for periods of renewal.142 This stands in stark contrast to the 
far longer periods allowed for copyrights, which at present under the 
Copyright Term Extension Act may extend up to 70 years after an 
author’s death: the commercial context offers no strong rationale to tie 
the duration of a copyright to the life of the inventor.143 For patents, 
there is nothing magical about fourteen years, and in some cases, as 
with pharmaceutical patents covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 
1984, allowances have to be made for those patented devices that 
cannot be sold because they are tied up in reviews by the Food and 
Drug Administration.144 Yet even if copyrights can run too long, the 
difference between patents and copyrights is evident because there are 
few inventions that will not be discovered in the ordinary course of 
business. So, for example, a ninety-nine-year patent period for a 
telephone would overlook the simple fact that there were rival applic–
ations before the Patent Office when Alexander Graham Bell received 
his patent.145 So, the patent is intended to speed up production by 
awarding protection only for the rate at which discovery is usefully 
hastened. 
 
monopoly rents do. See Joseph Shaanan, Ricardian or Monopoly Rents? The 
Perspective of Potential Entrants, 32 E. Econ. J. 19, 19–20 (2006). 
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
142. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10. 
143. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298 § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 
2827–28 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302). 
144. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417 § 201, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 156).  
145. Who is Credited With Inventing the Telephone?, Libr. of Cong. (Nov. 
19, 2019), https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/item/who-is-credited 
-with-inventing-the-telephone/ [https://perma.cc/8NEC-CMB9]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patent Originalism 
733 
The system of limited terms makes perfectly good sense, but it does 
not detract from the observation that patents, so limited, are fully 
vested property rights in the same fashion as leases and life estates. For 
patents to be efficient during the period for which they run, they have 
to have all the attributes that were recognized in the 1790 Patent Act, 
which includes the rights to sue and to license, and to obtain strong 
protection against intruders.146 The term limit therefore does nothing to 
undermine the claim that patents are property in the strong sense of 
the word, which is just the way the matter was understood during the 
Founding period. 
Conclusion 
Patent protection goes through strong and weak cycles. For the 
past twenty years there has been a determined effort to cut back on the 
scope of patent rights, both by judicial decision and the passage of the 
America Invents Act.147 I regard most of these initiatives as unwise not 
because I believe everything should be patented, nor that all patents 
should receive the strongest possible protection for the longest period 
of time. Rather, the defense of the earlier order is more nuanced, and 
it starts with the claim that patent rights are property rights that 
should receive the appropriate level of protection. That does not mean 
that patent rights should be able to obliterate the patent commons of 
general ideas and natural substances; nor does it mean that they should 
be perpetual in length or subject to injunctive relief in any and all cases. 
But it does mean that the efforts to reframe patent law should not be 
curbed by the Alice/Mayo doctrine. Further, injunctions and strong 
damages should be the presumption in cases of deliberate infringement, 
and patents should not be routinely invalidated through administrative 
proceedings. Patent rights are obtained by grant, and they should be 
protected by the remedies ordinarily given to grantees. There have been 
many efforts, such as that by Paul Clement, to insist that patents did 
not receive this form of protection during the Founding Period. But 
those claims are demonstrably false, as there is no indication that either 
the Constitution or the Patent Act of 1790 tend to withhold from 
patents, once issued, the same level of protection that was, and is, 
afforded other forms of property. What were sound constitutional 
principles then are sound constitutional principles today, and the recent 
cases that have deviated from those principles should be condemned for 
their constitutional infidelity and for the social inefficiencies that they 
introduce. 
 
146. Patent Act of 1790 § 4. 
147. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011). 
